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MICRONESIA AND FREE ASSOCIATION:
CAN FEDERALISM SAVE THEM?
JOHN B. METELSKI*
For over 400 years, a large area of the Western Pacific-
Micronesia-has been under foreign political control. Beginning
with Spain in the 16th century, control passed from Germany, to
Japan, and to the United States in 1947 as administering author-
ity for the United Nations designated Trust Territory of the Pa-
cific.
Pursuant to article 76(b) of the United Nation's Charter, a
measure of internal self-government is now being negotiated be-
tween the representatives of the people of the Trust Territory and
the United States. While previous efforts of the Micronesian lead-
ers have been designed to obtain from the United States a larger
(or total) degree of self-determination, preliminary results of re-
cent negotiations indicate that, at least on major internal matters,
-this objective has been substantially accomplished. As a result,
a new dilemma faces the Territorial leaders: how to organize
Micronesia for self-government.
It is the purpose of this article to investigate one form of
governmental structure, the federation, in the Micronesian con-
,text. Relevant background data will be presented illustrating the
political and economic divisions within the Trust Territory, and
whether or not these can be overcome in a federal system. Some
of the critical factors which have determined the success or
failure of other federations will be considered against the back-
ground of the Micronesian experience.
I. BACKGROUND FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FORMATION
OF POLITICAL SUB-UNITS WITHIN THE TRUST TERRITORY
Micronesia consists of a vast area of the Pacific lying north
of the equator and considerably west of Hawaii.' The Trust
* Attorney, United States Department of Defense, Washington, D.C..
B.S.E.E., Gannon College; M.S.E.E., Renssalear Polytechnic Institute; J.D.
Georgetown University Law Center. Member, Pennsylvania and District of
Columbia Bars.
1. The island groups include the Marianas, Carolines, Marshalls and Gil-
berts. Bryan, Pacific Island Groups, in PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION CENTER,
THE MARsHALLS AND THE PACIFIC 3 (1965), Bernice P. Bishop Museum.
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Territory of the Pacific Islands is a subset of Micronesia consist-
ing of three archipelagoes: the Marianas (except for Guam which
is an unincorporated United States territory); the Carolines; and
the Marshalls.2 In area, the Trust Territory embraces almost
the whole of Micronesia. Due to political activity in the area,
the two designations have come to be used interchangeably.3
The geography of the area involves such great inter-island
distances that no common cultural pattern has uniformly de-
veloped in the Trust Territory. Small island groupings have de-
veloped -their own customs, social systems, and languages. Even
physical characteristics are noticeably diverse. Nine major lan-
guages with multiple dialects clearly indicate the distinct ethnic
entities within the island groupings.4
As western man began to make contact with Micronesia,5
he did not affect all the island cultures equally. Some group-
ings, most notably the Marianas and the Marshalls, underwent
significant westernization from many years of whaler and mis-
sionary contacts. The Carolines, on the other hand, were rela-
tively isolated until they were heavily settled and intermixed with
Japanese prior to World War 11.6
Western attempts to derive economic benefits from -the Ter-
ritory focused mainly on agriculture. Since the majority of Mi-
cronesian soil is suitable only for limited production of copra
and other subsistence foods,7 the effect of these programs was
relatively uniform across the Territory. This situation changed
when the United States, with a large budget," began to adminis-
ter the islands, making Saipan the administrative center as well
2. 22 DEP'T STATE ANN. REP. T'rPI 1 (1969).
3. Blaz & Lee, The Cross of Micronesia, 23 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 59,
61 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Cross of Micronesia].
4. J. COULTER, THE PACIFIC DEPENDENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES 169
(1957). See also Bryan, Pacific Island Groups, in PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC INFORMA-
TION CENTER, THE MARSHALLS AND THE PACIFIC 2 (1965), Bernice P. Bishop
Museum.
5. Magellan sighted Guam on March 6, 1521. P. CARANo & P. SANCHEZ,
A COMPLETE HISTORY OF GUAM 41 (1964).
6. See Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 62.
7. A subsistence economy based on copra is the "starting point" of Micro-
nesian agriculture. The Japanese were the most notable for their development
of rice and organized copra production. But no great advances were made such
that one district's economy significantly surpassed another's. See Cross of Micro-.
nesia, supra note 3, at 62.
8. $17.5 million in 1963 to $50 million in 1970. See Cross of Micronesia,
supra note 3, at 59.
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as the Congressional headquarters of Micronesia, while beginning
to develop military research bases in the Marshalls.9 The result
is that district economics, once uniform throughout the territory,
now distinguish island groups from one another.
The United States administration of Micronesia began in
1947 under a United Nations Trusteeship Agreement approved
by the Security Council'0 and the United States government.,
The first fifteen years of administration were characterized by a
period of frugality and non-disturbance of the Micronesians. This
was intended to foster the growth of what was believed desirable
in a modernized native society. Notwithstanding the merits of this
plan, it fostered a period in which whatever uniformity imparted
by foreign influence (such as a lingua franca) deteriorated, and
the area returned to localized customs, languages and attitudes.'"
The U.S. did not discourage this factionalism but recognized it by
organizing the Trust Territory administrative machinery into seven
districts.1 8
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRUST TERRITORY AS A
POLITICAL ENTITY IN THE 1960's
The 1960's marked a period of renewed U.S. interest in the
welfare of the Trust Territory. This was due to several converg-
ing factors. The most notable of these factors were: (1) the in-
dependence of other United Nations Trusteeships; 4 (2) the
9. Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshalls provides employment for over 4000
on-site Americans, driving Micronesian income tax revenue from the Marshalls
higher than any other Trust Territory District. The Micronitor, April 4, 1972,
at 7, col. 4.
10. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was designated a strategic area
by the United Nations (U.N.). This means that the Administering Authority
has the right to fortify and close off any part of the Territory for security reasons.
The terms of the agreement cannot be altered without the consent of the Admin-
istering Authority, and the functions of the U.N. relating to the strategic trustee-
ship are exercised by the Security Council (with its rule of unanimity) instead
of the General Assembly. U.N. CHARTER arts. 82, 83, 84.
11. The Navy continued administration of the Trusteeship until 1951 when
responsibility was turned over to the Department of Interior. See Cross of Micro-
nesia, supra note 3, at 64.
12. W. PRICE, AMERICA'S PARADISE LOsT 184, 233, 234 (1966).
13. These districts include the (1) Marshall Islands District, (2) Palau Dis-
trict, (3) Ponape District, (4) Rota District, (5) Saipan District, (6) Truk Dis-
trict, and (7) Yap District.
14. Of the eleven U.N. trusteeships, only two remain-Micronesia (U.S.)
and New Guinea (Australia). Western Samoa became independent in 1962 and
Nauru in 1968, See Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 66, 67.
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granting of statehood to Hawaii, which provided congressional rep-
resentation for the Pacific area; 15 and (3) the pasage of United
Nations Resolutions 1541 (XV) and 1542 (XV). Resolution
1541 (XV) censured Portugal for the administration of its Trusts,
while Resolution 1542 (XV) declared the necessity for ending
colonialism and establishing the Committee of 24, the forum for
filing petitions for self-determination by colonized countries."
By 1962, the United States had decided to re-evaluate
its policy of frugality toward its Trust Territory and to adopt a
more generous relationship. The decision was made to bring Mi-
cronesia into the twentieth century as quickly as possible. Em-
phasis was placed on consolidating future relations between Mi-
cronesia and the United States.17  This was undertaken through
educational,18 social,' 9 economic, 20 and political2 development
15. Hawaii has long championed the cause of Micronesia. Senator Fong
and Senator Inouye have introduced legislation to make the Trust Territory
eligible for benefits under the Public Works and Economic Development Act and
to develop skipjack tuna fisheries. See Bill To Aid Economics, Pacific Daily
News, February 4, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
Representative Patsy Mink from Hawaii provides representation for Micro-
nesia in the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Representative
Mink is also responsible for making minimum wage laws applicable to Micro-
nesians employed at the Kwajalein Missile Range, thereby keeping the more edu-
cated Micronesians employed at the higher paying American jobs (gardening,
housekeeping, etc.) rather than working for the Trust Territory on their islands
in such occupations as school teachers or public administrators at the wages com-
mensurate with the local economy.
A more recent far-sighted activity of Representative Mink has been to lend
support to the Marianas secessionist movement. See Mink Advocates Congress
Boycott, Micronesia Star, May 8, 1971, at 1; Marianas Delegation Boycotts Con-
gress of Micronesia Secession, Id.
16. See G.A. Res. 1541 (xv) and 1542 (xv), U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 29-
31, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
17. N. MELLER, THE CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA 18 (1969). This conclusion
is verified by a theoretically secret report by the Chairman of President Kennedy's
survey team which visited the islands in 1963, Anthony M. Solomon. The Solo-
mon Report, as it has since become known, was obtained, reproduced and distrib-
Uted by a group of Micronesian students at the University of Hawaii in April
of 1971. The thrust of The Solomon Report is that by increasing U.S. financial
aid, loyalty of the Trust Territory will be assured via the resultant economic de-
pendency.
18. Emphasis was placed on the teaching of English as a second language
(TESL Program) and thus providing a lingua franca for the nine major linguistic
groups. Public High Schools were opened in each of the Districts. See Cross
of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 67, 68.
19. Health Services received crash program treatment and were given added
impetus in 1965 by a critical World Health Organization investigation which re-
ported a prevalence of tuberculosis and general sanitation poverty. U.N. Trustee-
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programs in the islands.
A. The Congress of Micronesia
In 1964, the United States took a significant step toward
giving the Micronesians a voice in their own government by cre-
ating the Congress of Micronesia.12  In addition to the immedi-
ate effect of providing a vehicle for representative self-govern-
ment, a centralized political entity existed with which the Micro-
nesians could identify as a territory for the first time in their his-
tory.
2 3
The Congress did not idly play the role of intermediary
between the United States and the District governments. In-
stead, it first pursued the task of regaining control over Micro-
nesian land.24  Secondly, the Congress explored the rights of the
territory under the United Nations in order to formulate a posi-
tion on future political status.2 5  These actions reflect two cohe-
ship Council, Report of the World Health Organization on Its Investigation of
the Complaints Contained on a Petition Concerning the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, U.N. Doc. T/1647 (1966).
20. Under the appointment of M. Wilfred Goding as High Commissioner
in 1961, the budget of the Trust Territory was increased from $7.5 million to
$17.5 million. This rise continued steeply through the mid-sixties to $60 million
in fiscal year 1971. The door to tourism was opened by the granting of scheduled
air service to Continental Air Lines, which in turn promised to build tourist
hotels and develop air service. See Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 67.
21. One of the steps taken by the U.S. to ameliorate American political de-
velopment was the transfusion, by special Executive request in 1965, of massive
doses of Peace Corps Volunteers (P.C.V.'s). The total number for the Trust
Territory reached 665 in 1968, the greatest concentration of any host population.
By learning the local customs and language and living with the people, the
P.C.V.'s gave the Micronesians a look at a type of American different from the
occasional Trust Territory government employee. The number of volunteers was
reduced to 338 in 1971. U.N. Trusteeship Council, Provisional Verbatim Record,
U.N. Doc. T/PV. 1362, at 32 (1970). See also Kahn, A Reporter At Large:
Micronesia Revisited, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 1971, at 105.
22. Department of Interior Order No. 2882, September 28, 1964; 2 TRUST
TERRITORY CODE § 101.
23. The Congress consists of two Houses: a Senate with two Senators from
each District and a House of Representatives whose membership is based on pop-
ulation. Department of Interior Order No. 2918, December 27, 1968; 2 TRUST
TERRITORY CODE § 105.
24. Article 6(2) of the Trusteeship Agreement charges the Administering
Authority with securing the lands of the Trust against loss. The U.S. has done
this by forbidding the alienation of land to non-Micronesians. However, the U.S.
has the power of eminent domain within the territory, which has been an unhappy
experience for the Micronesians on several occasions. 22 DEP'T STATE ANN. REP.
TTPI 1 (1969). See also Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 70.
25. DeSmith, Options For Micronesia: A Potential Crisis For America's
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sive forces at work on a territory-wide basis: land control and a
desire for self-determination over internal affairs.
While attempts to alleviate the land problem did not effec-
tively progress, activities involving the political development of the
territory did. The 1966 session of the Congress petitioned Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson to create a commission to assess political
alternatives open to Micronesia.2" However, no action was forth-
coming from the United States. As a result, in 1967, the Con-
gress of Micronesia created its own Future Political Status Com-
mission17 to study the problem and to educate the people politi-
cally.
In June of 1968, the Status Commission issued an Interim
Report dealing with factors which transformed previously depend-
ent territories into independent ones.28  The Congress was im-
pressed. It appropriated an additional $70,000 for another re-
port subsequently issued as the Final Report of the Future Po-
litical Status Commission in July, 1969.9 The Final Report re-
jected integration with the American constitutional system, 30 ap-
praised the benefits and liabilities of independence, 8' 1 and rec-
ommended a status of "free association" with the United States
based on United Nations Resolution 1541 (XV).32
The significance of these activities in the context of this
study is that they were directed toward divesting foreign control,
in whole or in part, from Micronesia. The Final Report's recom-
mendation of "free association" did not define precisely what
this meant in terms of the operating agencies of the governments
involved. It addressed the issue of internal self-government only
incidentally with statements to the effect that unity must be in
harmony with decentralization. While it is logical to refrain
from crossing the bridge toward self-government until it appears
Pacific Trust Territory, 3 N.Y.U. CENTER INT'L STUDIES 4 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Options for Micronesia].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. These were reported as (1) local agitation; (2) U.N. pressure; and (3)
influential friends. Id., at 6.
29. See Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 72. Since the publication of
the Interim Report, the Future Political Status Commission had visited Nauru,
Cook Islands, American Samoa, Fiji, and New Guinea. They had also retained
Professor James W. Davidson of the Australian National University, advisor to
the Cook Islands and Western Samoa's independent committees.
30. See Options for Micronesia, supra note 25, at 15.
31. Id., at 10, 18.
32. See Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 72.
1974
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to be a possibility, reflection at this stage could have revealed
that the only common unifying force behind the Status issue was
foreign domination and that significant problems would arise
once this domination was relaxed.88
B. First Status Talks 1969
The Micronesian Congress endorsed the Final Report of its
Commission and undertook to carry its recommendations to the
United States by creation of the Future Political Status Delega-
tion.84  This delegation was authorized to engage in discussions
with the U.S. and to resolve the issue. After several interim
meetings between both parties in Washington, an official United
States delegation met with the Micronesian Delegation in Saipan
from May 4 through May 8, 1970.11 The approach of the United
States delegation was essentially to present a blueprint offer of
traditional Commonwealth status.3 6 The Micronesian Delegation,
on the other hand, set forth certain principles it desired to nego-
tiate.17  The results of the talks constituted a stalemate with the
United States failing to negotiate and the Micronesians rejecting
their proposals."'
The substance of the United States' proposal took shallow
cognizance of the form of internal self-government of the Terri-
tory except for the standard "boiler plate" requirement that it be
"consistent with" the United States form of government. 9 The
Micronesian position began to address this issue but it was never
reached due to disagreement and the subsequent termination of
the talks on other grounds. Indications were, however, that in
33. The U.N. especially recognized this fact and opposed the concept of
"Micro States". See Options for Micronesia, supra note 25, at 8-10. A most re-
vealing testimony to this caveat was the discovery that each District feared the
taking of land for U.S. military bases. See Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3,
at 62, 72.
34. L. & Res. Cong. Micronesia, 3d Cong., Pub. L. No. 3C-15 (Aug. 29,
1969).
35. For the detailed synopsis of these talks, see Report of Political Status
Delegation of the Congress of Micronesia MICRONESAN REPORTER 18 (3d Quar-
ter 1970).
36. Id., at 21, 26.
37. For example, sovereignty resides in the Micronesian people so that any
association should be unilaterally revocable, and Micronesia shall be governed by
a constitution under either Free Association or Independence. Id., at 25, 26.
38. The three key issues found unacceptable by the Micronesian Delegation
were U.S. control of land, laws, and future termination. Id., at 24, 25.
39. Id., at 21. In the area of recognition of governments, this position has
historically proven to be an illusory criteria. See W. BIsHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAw
CASES AND MATuLs 339-345 (3d ed. 1971).
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support of a primary concern for preservation of traditional Micro-
nesian culture, the Delegation favored preservation of District
identities which would be autonomous from a central Micronesian
authority. This position reflected the strong sentiment favoring
District loyalties rather than a national territorial identity. To the
perspicacious observer, this would present future difficulties in or-
ganizing a cooperative system of self-government."
The Delegation concluded its report to -the Congress of Mi-
cronesia with some very positive recommendations designed to
break this impasse.4 ' As a result of this and other factors influ-
encing the United States position 4 2 the groundwork was estab-
lished for another round of Status Talks in 1971. It should be
observed that throughout this activity, the Micronesians have ex-
hibited an intelligent and capable approach in their negotiating
position,43 and subsequent to the 1969 talks, the United States re-
sponded by establishing its own Office of Micronesian Status Ne-
gotiations to deal directly with the highest levels in the Executive
Branch.
44
III. THE HANA-MAUI STATUS TALKS AND THE NEW CHALLENGE:
CAN MICRONESIA ACHIEVE SELF-GOVERMENT AS AN ENTITY?
The second round of Status Talks were held at Hana, Maui,
40. See Mihaly, U.S. Strategy In the Western Pacific and the Micronesian
Dilemma, INsT. INT'L STu. 21 (U.C. Berkeley 1970).
41. Specific steps advocated were the commissioning of an economic study
of free association versus independent status; seeking the assistance of the U.N.
Committee On Decolonization (Comm. of 24) to advise and explain issues to
the Micronesians; the retention of a Washington, D.C. based law firm to represent
Micronesia's interests in the Capital (now a reality via the firm of Clifford,
Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney). A most important recommendation was for
the convening of a constitutional convention to address the problem of internal
self-government. See note 35, supra, at 29.
42. The releasing of Okinawa from U.S. control and the Nixon pullback
from Vietnam both weighed against upsetting the friendly relations with the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands.
43. In addition to retaining James W. Davidson, the Micronesian Status
Committee retained Dr. Thomas Gladwin of Hawaii as an advisor on independ-
ence and Dr. Eugene B. Mihaly, University of California at Berkeley. See notes
29 and 40 supra. See also Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 76, 77.
44. The President appointed Franklin Hadyn Williams (President of the
Asia Foundation) as Ambassador to the Status Negotiations in March 1971; cre-
ated the Office For Micronesian Status Negotiations in Washington in July 1971;
and recalled Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., from Burma, to head that office
in August, 1971. See Dorrance, Micronesia's Future Status: The Most Important
Question, MICRONESAN REPORTER 13 (4th Quarter 1971). [hereinafter cited as
Dorrance].
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Hawaii in October, 1971. These talks were preceded by exten-
sive preparation and organization by both sides.4"
The preliminaries were not without consequence. The
United States came prepared -to grant full internal automony and
self-government to the Micronesians,46 including control over all
land and resources47 and full power to protect traditional values
and customs. Relations between the two countries would be gov-
erned by a Compact, 48 which would grant to the United States
power over Micronesian foreign affairs49 and defense, with termi-
45. The Third Congress of Micronesia endorsed the position of its Status
Delegation at the Saipan talks and established a Joint Committee on Future Status
to coordinate and continue the work of the Status Commission and Status Dele-
gation. On the creation of the Status Delegation, see L. & Res. Cong. Micronesia,
3d Cong., Pub. L. No. 3C-15 (app'd Aug. 29, 1969). On the creation of the
Joint Committee on Future Status, see House Joint Res. No. 102, L. & Res. Cong.
Micronesia, 3d Cong., (app'd Aug. 14, 1970) and House Joint Res. No. 87, L.
& Res. Cong. Micronesia, 3d Cong. (app'd Aug. 25, 1970). The Joint Committee
also was authorized to study alternative forms of internal self-government. See
Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 84.
The United States delegation acknowledged the fact that what the Micro-
nesians desired had no U.S. Constitutional nor historical precedent, and a wholly
new approach unfettered by "textbook" definitions and concepts was adopted. The
Department of Defense was required to come up with specifics in future land
requirements. No "blueprint" offer in terms of a legislative draft bill was taken
to the talks, but rather it was deemed that the talks would concentrate on sub-
stance, exploring with the Micronesians how best to reach an agreement that
would respect each party's generalized obligations to one another's proposals. See
Dorrance, supra note 44, at 13.
46. The U.S. specifically stated that the Micronesian form of self-govern-
ment did not have to be "consistent with" the United States form of government,
and the U.S. would have no right of amendment. F. Williams, REPORT BY THE
PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR MICRONESIAN STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE HANA-MAUI, HAWAII TALKS, at 3 (Wash. D.C., Oct. 4-12, 1971) [herein-
after cited as Williams Report].
47. By this control, the U.S. would relinquish the power of eminent domain
permanently. Military land retention was specified by the delegation, the outside
limit being 3.8% of the total land in the Trust Territory with no requirements
at all in the districts of Yap, Truk and Ponape. Id., at 2, 3.
48. As stated in the Williams report:
We would assume that our agreement would be neither a treaty nor a
unilateral legislative act on the part of the United States but would,
rather, be a binding Compact with legal definition of its own and recog-
nized as such by both parties and by the world community.
The Compact would be subject to the advance approval of the Con-
gress of Micronesia and a final review and acceptance by the people
of Micronesia as an expression of their full rights of self-determination.
The Compact would also be presented to both Houses of the United
States Congress for approval and to the President of the United States
for his signature.
See Williams Report, supra note 46, at 118, 119.
49. The government of Micronesia and its citizens are free to negotiate and
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nation by mutual consent.50
The terms stated by the Micronesians during the 1969 talks
were, in principle, satisfied by this position. 51 A subsequent
meeting held in Palau on April 2-13, 1972, has substantially
ameliorated existing problems.52 Other areas of lesser conse-
quence," such as the "details" of the relationship, have now be-
come matters of primary concern. Simply stated, these "details"
revolve around one key issue: Can Micronesia organize for self-
government?
5 4
This issue is more than rhetorical; its affirmative answer is
necessary before Micronesia can enjoy the autonomy she desires.
The problem is a basic one: economics. Over ninety percent of
Micronesia's public revenues are derived from United States as-
sistance.55 While these revenues are not necessarily contingent
on future complimentary relations between the parties, they are
contingent on the capability of the government to represent the
population, determine priorities, and administer the economy in
an equitable and efficient manner. United States federal assist-
ance to Micronesia, such as mail, banking, educational and judi-
cial programs, 56  available upon request after termination of the
Trusteeship, were presented by the U.S. Delcgation with a ubiqui-
tous inquiry: What Micronesian authority will the U.S. be deal-
sign contracts which do not involve intergovernmental obligations and responsi-
bilities. Micronesian participation in Regional Organizations is also permitted.
See Final Joint Communique, in OFFICE OF MICRONESIAN STATUS NEGOTIATIONS,
THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS,
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE FOURTH ROUND OF MICRONESIAN FUTURE POLITICAL
STATUS TALKS, at 1-4 (Koror, Palau, Apr. 2-13, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Final
Joint Communique]. Note the jure restionis, jure imperii analogy of the Tate
Letter. 26 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
50. See Williams Report, supra note 46, at 8.
51. See explanation in note 37 supra. The single most important area of
disagreement was the requirement of mutual consent for termination of the com-
pact. The crux of the Micronesian concern is that they do not believe they will
be able to maintain their identity and internal self-control where U.S. consent
is required for termination. See Williams Report, supra note 47, at 139. This
fear corresponds to the opinions of their advisor Eugene Mihaly. See Mihaly,
supra note 40, at 21. See also Stone, Free Association Must Be Free, by The
Micronitor, March 28, 1972, p. 1, col. 1.
52. Final Joint Communique, supra note 49, at 3.
53. Kluge, Looking Back, MICRONESIAN REPORTER (2d Quarter 1972).
54. Heine, The Most Important Question, MICRONESIAN REPORTER (4th
Quarter 1971). [hereinafter cited as Heine]. Mr. Carl Heine, a Micronesian, has
often been referred to as the father of Micronesian unity.
55. Ramon, Inside Ponape, The Micronitor, May 23, 1972, at 8, col. 1.
56. See Williams Report, supra note 46, at 4, 5.
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ing with in the administration of these services? 57
The mandate for Micronesia to organize itself for self-gov-
ernment is clearly visible. The only constraints emanating from
the Hana-Maui talks were that the internal government could not
conflict with the provisions of the Compact, and that a democratic
form of government with a Bill of Rights be instituted.58 This
principle has already been embraced by the Micronesians.
59
These constraints are de minimus in relation to the eventual form
of self-government.
With the prospects of internal control over land and reve-
nues imminent, cooperation among the Districts ground to a
halt. 60 A resurgence of District sentiment found Truk threaten-
ing to "go it alone" as an independent District, the Marshalls
,threatening secession, and Yap, Palau and Ponape adopting a
"wait and see" attitude.6 1 The Marianas District voted to secede
from the rest of the territory in order to seek closer association
with the United States. On May 24, it sent a delegation to the
United Nations to consolidate this action.
62
IV. THE FEDERATION AS A FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND
SOME FEDERAL EXPERIENCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES
Federalism has never been "defined", but often "ex-
plained"."8 It would appear to be form rather than content,
or a system rather than a rule. It is therefore best described in
terms of elements and functions.
The classical elements of a federation are three: sub-unit,
central unit, and constitution. The powers of the sub-units, (such
57. See OFFICE OF MICRONESIAN STATUS NEGOTIATIONS, FUTURE POLITICAL
STATUS OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS MICRONESIA, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE SIXm ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, at 8-9 (Barbers Point, Oahu, Hawaii,
Sept. 28-Oct. 6, 1972).
58. See Williams Report, supra note 46, at 3.
59. CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA, REPORT OF THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS
COMMSSION, 3rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (Saipan, Mariana Islands, July 1969).
60. Heine, supra note 54.
61. Heine, supra note 54, at 20.
62. Interview with Paul C. Warnke, Member of the firm Clifford, Warnke,
Glass, McIlwain & Finney, in Washington, D.C., May 25, 1972. [hereinafter cited
as Warnke]. See firm reference in note 41 supra. See also The Micronitor, May
23, 1972, at 9, col. 2; Micronesia News Service (report) May 25, 1972, item No.
1.
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as states) are shared with the central unit or the central govern-
ment according to a pre-established formula, (such as a cons-titu-
ton). In the usual circumstance, the powers reserved to the
states concern domestic matters including police, health, and
safety powers. The power of the central government usually fo-
cuses on inter-state matters involving commerce and the power
to enter into relations with foreign government."4  This "mix""5
of powers, or "balance" 66 between state and central governments
exists not so much by precise planning and forethought, but by
the desires of the people to make it work. 
7
This desire to "make it work" comes from a belief that
some positive benefits will be derived from this form of govern-
ment. Riker 8 has delimited these benefits in two categories: (1)
a desire to aggregate or expand territory; and (2) preparation
for military-diplomatic threat or opportunity.69 This is about as
close as one can come to a federation in definition and explain-
ing what makes it work .
7
A. The British West Indies
The decision to federate in the West Indies was not
made in haste; four constitutional conferences were held between
1947 and 1957, supplemented by standing ad hoc commissions
to examine various aspeots of the plan.7 ' In 1957, the federation
64. Id.
65. See Trager, On Federalism, in WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL XI (1968)
[hereinafter cited as On Federalism].
66. Preface to Adams, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERN-
MENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST THE ATTACK OF M. TURGOT
IN His LETTER TO DR. PRICE at ii (3rd ed. 1797).
67. T. FRANCK, WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL 170 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
FRANCK].
68. See On Federalism, supra note 65, at XIV.
69. Examples of unifying forces in the United States are the "winning of
the West" and the war of independence. See FRANCK, supra note 67, at 184.
70. See On Federalism, supra note 65. From this point on one can only
make value judgments drawn out of experience as to the success or failure of
the federal system. It is useful to draw a distinction between a federation and
confederation for purposes of an understanding of each. In a confederation, each
sub-unit is fully sovereign, the central government serving little more purpose than
the diplomatic interrelations of the sub-units. Any actions of the central govern-
ment are on the sovereign states, not on the citizens. In a federation, the sub-
units are sovereign only in some areas, the central government in others. Actions
of the central government, as permitted by the constitution, devolve upon the citi-
zens directly. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
71. See Flanz, The West Indian Federation, in WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL 92
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Flanz].
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materialized under the West Indian Constitution. In October,
1961, Jamaica seceded.7 2  In January, 1962, Trinidad and Ta-
bago withdrew, and the West Indies Federation came to an end. 73
Publicists evaluating the causes for failure of what seemed
to be a well planned venture cite factors that fall into three gen-
eral categories: political, economic, and geographical/historical.
The political factors derived from defects in leadership and the
political institution.74  Jamaican leaders were opposed to the
federation for economic reasons and found it easy to undermine
the referendum vote on federation. Furthermore, petty insular-
isms of other islands opposed national unity. 5 Lastly, there ex-
isted no credible external threat to subordinate these petty ri-
valries. 71 The economic factors centered around the more weal-
thy islands' unwillingness to bind themselves to support their
poorer sister "states" in a federal scheme.77 Geographically, the
large inter-island distances, along with the historical tradition of
isolationism among the island, were cited as obstructive to federal-
ism. 78
It is interesting to note at this point that in searching for par-
allels to the Micronesian situation, most experts cautioned against
expecting to find even the vaguest comparable precedent 9.7  How-
ever, it seems that while not analagous in all areas, some of the
factors found in the West Indies situation are so very similar
to some conditions in Micronesia that it is worthwhile to point out
that the West Indies collapse occurred independent of the present
crisis in the Trust Territory. 0
B. The Cook Islands
The significant fact in relation to the government of the
72. Id., at 101.
73. Id., at 103.
74. See Flanz, supra note 71, at 113. "No factor or combination of factors
has been as effective in bringing about the debacle as Sir Alexander Bustamente's
catatonic insistence that the Federation should be destroyed." The Torchlight
(Grenada Newspaper), September 22, 1961.
75. See Flanz, supra note 71, at 104, 115.
76. Id. See also Campbell, The West Indies: Can They Stand Alone?, 39
INT'L AFF. 336 (1963).
77. Jamaica possessed a rich bauxite industry, and Trinidad, oil. See Flanz,
supra note 71, at 107, 108.
78. Id., at 104, 106.
79. Other federations which were considered truly lacked analogous value,
e.g., Malaysia, East Africa, and Rhodesia/Nyasaland.
80, This occurred in 1968. See Flanz, supra note 71.
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Cook Islands is that it is not a federation. While there are some
-ingredients in their relations with New Zealand which are federal
in nature, they !are better characterized ,as "quasi-federal".
Instead of a sovereign central government, they have a Council
of State;"' instead of a constitution delineating the relationships
between the Council of State and the sub-units, it delineates rela-
tions between sub-units, central government and the "mother
country" of New Zealand.
2
Despite the lack of similarity to the classical federation,
these quasi-federations are not uncommon in regard to mini-
states administered by a stronger power.8 3  They are recog-
nized as operating as a "clearing house of benefits" to the
weaker state, eliminating the reciprocal quid pro quos for co-op-
eration between equal states utilizing ad hoc agreements.8 4  The
significant innovative feature of these arrangements is that they
leave the political organs and prerogatives of national sovereign-
ity largely unaffected by the unity brought to aspects of the eco-
nomic and judicial systems, among others. Quasi-federations have
been recognized as likely to succeed where a political federation
would fail for lack of any common primary ideological commit-
ment which is widely shared.8 5
C. Factors Affecting the Success of Federations
A study of the multitude of variables under which federa-
tions have succeeded or failed makes it difficult to isolate and
quantify ,the factors which might be used to predict their futures.
Nevertheless, this has been attempted by a number of scholars,
and the consensus of their findings is not without merit.""
Classical federations which have proved successful, such as
the United States, are observed to have begun with positive char-
isma for the value of federation, such as "winning the west".
This is usually accompanied by common language and ethnic
ties. This is not to say that these elements are sufficient for a
81. Cook Islands Constitution Act of 1964, N.Z. Stat. No. 69, Part I § 4
(N.Z.).
82. Id., c. 5, 6 et seq.
83. See FRANCK, supra note 67, at 199 n.16.
84. Id., at 194.
85. Id., at 195.
86. In the classical sense, federations are considered "failures" when associa-
tion of the sub-units and the central government according to the constitution
ceases. See FRANCK, supra note 67, at 169, 170. See also R. WATTS, NEW FEDER-
ATIONS (1966) [hereinafter cited as WATTS].
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federation to succeed, but some scholars consider the supremacy
of the political federal value as the necessary element. 7  While
it is widely acknowledged that this element can be brought about
by secondary factors, in most federations studied (including the
West Indies) this primary factor existed before actual federa-
tion.
88
Therefore, it is important in the aforementioned context to
realize that there is no "definition" of federation until a nation's
leaders "design" it. This design process must account for the
popular desires of the people. Historical "molds" should be
avoided in the formulation.
89
Studies also indicate that factors such as common enemies,
common challenges, common languages, and cultural values are
secondary to the eventual success of the federation. These ele-
ments appear to be enough to bring a federation into being and
provide a transitional step to the primary factor of ideological
commitment to federalism. By themselves, however, unless the
transition is made, the federation will probably fail.9"
V. FEDERALISM AND MICRONESIA
In considering federation as a form of government for Mi-
cronesia, this study focuses on detecting and evaluating the fac-
tors believed to be influential in the success or failure of a federal
system. The "starting point" for the evaluation is 'the existence
of five sub-units: the Palau, Yap, Truk, Ponape and Marshall
Districts.91 Evaluation of detected factors will be in reference to
whether or not the constitutional "formula" can successfully dis-
tribute power between the sub-units and some central govern-
ment.
A. "Negative Indicators" for Micronesian Federalism
By far the biggest problem facing the Trust Territory is the
disparate ethnic and district loyalties.92  Much of the background
87. See FRANCK, supra note 67, at 172.
88. id., at 177.
89. "Attempts to . . . federate little nations are doomed to failure if the
efforts are imposed from the outside. . . and if the population has not been pre-
pared." J. Rappaport, et al., Small States And Territories: Status and Problems
57 (a UNITAR Study, 1971). Accord, see FRANCK, supra note 67, at 169.
90. Id., at 172. See also WATrs supra note 86, at 47, 99.
91. The Marianas are assumed "out" of the Trust Territory insofar as fed-
eration is concerned.
92. See Micronesia Disunity Will Be Worse Before It's Better, Micronesia
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data presented herein has shown the existence of these loyal-
ties throughout foreign domination. 8  Foreign domination has
been ci-ted as the one unifying force in the Territory,9 4 and is a
reality of the U.S. Trusteeship also.95 Since that threat is now re-
laxing, the regional loyalties are replacing territorial loyal-ties. 6
The Districts other than the Marianas whose isolationist senti-
ments seem to be the strongest are Truk and the Marshalls.O
T
Truk's desire is for independence from the United States and not
necessarily from the other Districts. Future status discussions may
well ameliorate Truk's extreme position.9" The Marshalls' para-
mount discontent with federation is economic in nature. How-
ever, there is also the feeling of more westernized "elitism" in
the Marshalls than in the other District, thereby militating toward
closer association with the United States.99
This bodes ill for federalism in view of both the theoretical
analysis of factors necessary for federation success, 100 and the
parallel experience of the West Indies."0' The paramount "will
to make the federation work" can hardly be extracted from any
constitutional formula when that will is contrary to unity per se.10 2
A factor somewhat related to District sentiments is the diffi-
culty of educating a small population spread over a wide area
concerning -the political consequences of federation. To most Mi-
cronesians, federalism is associated with Americanization-some-
Star, June 26, 1971, at 7. See also Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 80-
83; Dorrance, supra note 44, at 12; Heine, supra note 54.
93. See text accompanying notes 1-13 supra.
94. See Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 80.
95. The threat most feared in each District was the emplacement of U.S.
military bases. See CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA, supra note 59, at 26.
96. See Heine, supra note 54, at 19; text accompanying notes 45-62, supra.
See also Dominick Still Wants Separate Negotiations, the Micronitor, March
28, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
97. See Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 82. See also Anti-Independ-
ence Group Forms, Micronesia Star, July 9, 1971, at 1; Carl Heine Critical of
Marshalls Proposal, The Micronitor, March 28, 1972, at 1.
98. See text accompanying notes 61-62, supra. See also Heine, supra note
54, at 20.
99. See Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 82.
100. See text accompanying notes 63-90, supra.
101. Id.
102. Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 1, stated that the most for-
midable obstacle to federation is state politicians resisting a diminution of their
powers. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (A. Hamilton). This is no less applicable in
Micronesia where district officials will have to accommodate inter-District influ-
ences with the coming of federation. Authorities cited note 97, supra. See text
accompanying notes 107-116, inIra, in regard to Marshalls District and money.
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thing to be avoided. 10 3 The consequences of this will accrue if
there is to be an eventual vote on a future political status change.
The United Nations should undertake a program of political edu-
cation of the populace to avoid the manipulation of the people's
vote by self-interested legislators, as occurred in the West In-
dies.'"
Despite the existence of the Congress for over five years, no
charismatic leader has appeared to rally ,the Districts together for
national unity." 5 Powerful Micronesians have emerged from De-
fense Department revenues, but none of them have been willing
to part with that power in the interests of national unity.1 "
Economic differences between districts do not exist because
of inherent natural resources or agriculture.0 7 They exist because
of the Trust Territory government salaries at Saipan"" and military
land rentals in the Marshalls. 109 In March, 1971, an income tax
law was imposed throughout the territory,1 0 further boosting the
revenues of the Marianas and the Marshalls." l ' This illustrates
the parallels with the West Indies failure. 112  It shows the un-
willingness of the wealthier sub-units to enter into an arrangement
that would require them to divest part of their wealth in support
of their poorer neighbors."' After the Marianas pull-out, ample
103. See Heine, supra note 54, at 19, 20; Options for Micronesia, supra note
25, at 15.
104. In the British West Indies, the voters did not vote on the political con-
cepts of federation or separatism, but whether federation would cut administrative
overhead and be a profitable venture for the island. See FRANCK, supra note 67,
at 197. Accord, for U.N. function, see Report, supra note 35, at 29.
105. See Heine, supra note 54, at 20.
106. See The Micronitor, April 4, 1972, at 7, col. 1.
107. These revenues are essentially equal throughout the Districts. See text
accompanying notes 7-9, supra.
108. HICOM Signs Tax Bill Into Law, Micronesia Star, March 13, 1971, at
5, col. 3.
109. It addition to rentals for Eniwetok and islands in the Kwajalein Atoll,
the U.S. Military pays $420,000 yearly to keep four square miles of land vacant
for missle testing. The Micronitor, December 24, 1970, at 1.
110. CONG. OF MICRONESIA, S. Bill 4, 4th Cong. (1971).
111. The Marshall Islands accounts for fifty-six percent ($1.4 million) of all
income in the Trust Territory; the Marianas for nineteen percent, with the re-
maining Districts accounting for the rest. See HICOM, supra note 108, at 1,
col. 4.
112. See Flanz, supra note 71; and text accompanying note 77.
113. For example, it was stated that:
The Marshalls' desire to negotiate separately is not a cultural problem,
rather it is a money problem with certain Marshallese leaders concerned
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signals have issued from the Marshalls that they intend to avoid
support of poorer Districts at all costs114 by following the Mari-
anas lead." 5
It would appear doubtful that any central government involv-
ing all Districts could be considered a federation without having
power to apportion revenues among the Districts. If the Mar-
shalls can somehow be considered in this group, not burdened
with the economics of its sister Districts, then hope for federation
may exist. Even then, however, it should be observed that "ac-
quiescence" in a federal scheme is not enough. There must be
some benefits derived therefrom."'
B. Reasons Supporting a Micronesian Federation
Paradoxically, the main reasons for a Micronesian federation
come from the United States. The reasons do not deal directly
with why the sub-units should unite, but rather point up the bene-
fits of having a central representative body to deal with the
United States. Even though the general principles of self-deter-
mination in internal affairs have been agreed upon by the United
States, there will be extensive negotiations in the future to "work
out the details". A united Micronesia will have a much better
chance of obtaining the "details" each individual district desires"17
as a group negotiator than they would negotiating independ-
ently. 1 8
See Carl Heine Critical of Marshalls Proposal, The Micronitor, March 28, 1972,
at 1.
114. See Dominick, supra note 96; see also, Kabua, The Micronitor, April 4,
1972, at 1.
115. The influence of the U.S. dollar on the Marshalls' leadership should
not be underestimated. A shoddy effort involving Amata Kabua to torpedo the
long awaited U.S. Senate Joint Resolution 30 (Micronesia War Claims) in an
attempt to obtain more funds was barely averted by Senators Salii and Santos
of the Marianas in April, 1971. See Salii-Santos Declare Efforts to Stop TT War
Claims Bill "Insane", Micronesia Star, April 24, 1971, at 1, and Herrop-Freeman,
id., at 9. A more recent behind the scenes maneuver involved Senator Kabua's
conflicts of interest in criticizing a fishing survey in the Marshalls. See The Mi-
cronitor, May 23, 1972, at 5; see also Kabua, The Micronitor, January 11, 1972,
at 1.
116. See text accompanying note 90, supra.
117. For example, economic and technical assistance from both U.S. and for-
eign countries; membership in the U.N.; regional organizations; import-export
controls; and trade agreements. See Williams Report, supra note 46, at 87, 88.
118. For Advisor Mihaly's reaction, see The Micronitor, April 4, 1972, at
7, col. 1. See also, Wamke, supra note 62, and Mihaly, supra note 40, at 21.
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A beginning has been initiated in principle at least, for a
federated form of government. The Congress of Micronesia is
visible and active as an operating organ analogous to a central
government. The United States has negotiated a future political
status on the implied assumption that it will be dealing with one
Micronesian government. 119 It has also encouraged and endorsed
a "central government" concept. 120  It would seem logical to im-
plement this concept to test its feasibility before casting aside the
existing form without a trial effort. Perhaps from the contours
of the constitution with some minor alterations in congress and
sub-units, the primary factor of federal ideological commitment
will emerge. At any rate, now would appear to be the time to
try it 12 ' while the institutions still stand.
It would appear 'that if the United States is to handle foreign
affairs and defense 2 2 for the Micronesians, such would be facili-
tated if there were one government with which the U.S. must con-
sult rather than three to six. For this practical reason, in addition
to those stated in its endorsements of a central government in
Micronesia, the U.S. may prefer to see a federation emerge.
Despite the pre-occupation with District and ethnic cultures,
there are indications -that -the younger Micronesians are bored with
their culture.' 23 This has been observed by the author in personal
visits to the "outer islands" in the Marshalls. The sacrifice of
,territorial unity for the cause of cultural identity, therefore, may
be more illusory than real. In this context, it is significant to note
that the younger Micronesians in Hawaii advocating independence
do so on a Territorial basis, not District.
The life style of the Micronesians is primarily enhanced by
United States services and programs including mail, banking,
health, and education. The United States has offered to extend
these services after termination of the present Trusteeship at the
119. At the Fourth round of Status Talks at Palau, the United States and
Micronesia agreed that their future relations would be governed by a compact-
implying unity in both parties. See The Joint Communique, supra note 49.
120. See Williams Report, supra note 46, at 108.
121. See Warnke, supra note 62.
122. In the defense area, the objective is denial, much more easily imple-
mented by being able to control the Trust Territory as a unit rather than as three
to six separate district governments. See Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at
77, 78.
123. Kahn, A Reporter At Large: Micronesia Revisited, in The New Yorker
Magazine, December 18, 1971, at 108.
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request of the Micronesian government providing appropriate U.S.
laws and regulations will govern these services.' 24
It is realistic to assume that many of these services will be
continued after a new status is achieved. It would appear that
the uniform influence of these programs and laws would, at least
ito some extent, render District "individuality" less distinct and
more susceptible to co-operation with sister Districts. This is but
part of a larger realization that the revenues and hence the life-
style upon which the entire Territory has come to depend is a
substantial element of a continuing commonality which can be best
administered by a federation.' 25
A somewhat political aspect of future economic assistance
from the United States also points to the creation of a central gov-
ernmental authority. It is the realization that if, in the future,
the Districts apply for United States aid on an individual basis,
the United States will administer funds by much the same pro-
cedure as does the Trust Territory government now. In other
words, the decision as to the amount allocated to each District
would be a United States decision. If, on the other hand, a cen-
tral Micronesian government obtains funds for the entire territory,
then Districts will be dealing with Micronesian authorities, and the
decision as to the amount to be dispersed to each District will be
a Micronesian decision.
The biggest question mark remaining in uniting the Territory
involves the Marshal Island District. The Districts of Palau, Yap,
Truk and Ponape will most likely consider some form of union
as in their best interests in order to obtain such benefits as future
aid.'2 6 Whether the Marshalls can be united in this grouping de-
pends on: (1) the position the United States adopts regarding
a separate status; (2) the influence of the Berkeley and United
Nations advisors; and (3) the terms of the arrangement effecting
the union. Of these factors concerning the Marshalls' unity, the
first is the most important because the United States' attitude will
influence greatly the terms of any future agreement.
Even if a suitable plan for union is achieved, it should be re-
called that this will not be a federation in the classical sense, but a
124. See Williams Report, supra note 46, at 49.
125. For a scholarly treatment of how Micronesia can wrest itself from the
U.S. economy and become truly independent, see Albers, Micronesian Independ-
ence: An Economic Problem, Micronesia Star, September 11, 1971, at 7.
126. See Cross of Micronesia, supra note 3, at 82.
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"quasi-federation" involving a third-party stronger nation.12 7
The requirements for the success of the "quasi-federation" are
much less severe," 8 and quite analogous to the Micronesian situa-
tion.
In retrospect, the -two biggest factors which will influence the
prospects for federation are District sentiments and economic dis-
crepancies between Districts, both negative factors.12 9  However,
as has been shown, these factors are not without ameliorating ar-
guments.'3 0 It should seem that the attitude of the people toward
a federative scheme will be the primary factor in Micronesia, as




As long as Micronesia remains economically dependent on
the United States, the United States laws and policies will be in-
fluential. Economic dependence appears to be the reality, at
least in the immediate future. In view of these circumstances, a
united central Micronesian authority in a united territory is consid-
ered to be the best method for dealing with the United States and
the Districts.
1 33
The organ for such a united territorial authority already ex-
ists in the Congress of Micronesia. The advantages of the Con-
gress as a future central authority are twofold: first, it already
exists as an operating body; and second, it is identified by the pop-
ulation as a popular Micronesian institution. The governmental
structure for federal unity within the territory is available and
should be given a chance to work.
While the elements of a federation (sub-units and central
authority) are present, the constitutional formula or mix uniting
these two structures depends upon the desire of the people to
make this formula work. This in turn requires that discernable
127. See text accompanying notes 81-85, supra (Cook Islands).
128. See On Federalism, supra note 67, at 195.
129. See text accompanying notes 92-106, supra (Negative Indicators).
130. See text accompanying notes 117-132 (Reasons Supporting).
131. See On Federalism, supra note 67, at 172.
132. Interview with Professor Stanley D. Metzger, Georgetown University
Law Center, Washington, D.C., March, 1972.
133. See, Warnke, supra note 62; Heine, supra note 54; Mihaly, supra note
40, at 21; and DeSmith, supra note 25, at 8, 9.
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benefits exist in the federal form of government.13 4  Overwhelm-
ing opinion in the case of Micronesia indicates that they do. 133
The people's awareness and acceptance of -these benefits de-
pends on their leaders. Micronesian leaders themselves must
overcome petty District self-interests136 and continue in the spirit
of territorial unity which has brought them to -the threshold of
Free Association. The willingness of the Micronesian leadership
to do this will be a major factor in federal unity.'
37
In a larger sense, the issue before the Micronesians is not one
of safety or well-being, but one of identity. The desire for self-
determination has brought them to the point where they have con-
trol over their own affairs for the first time in 400 years. Whether
there is a "Micronesia" which can emerge as an entity from this, or
simply a number of island groupings preferring to exist under a
stronger country's trust, is the case to be proven.
134. See text accompanying notes 64-70, supra.
135. See note 133, supra.
136. See note 115, supra.
137. See text accompanying note 74, supra. See also Heine, note 54, supra.
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